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  ABSTRACT 
The choice of corporate finance is an important source of tax planning opportunities for 
multinational companies. Investing companies have to be aware of inconsistent tax 
classification of equity and debt between countries in particular. Additionally, thin 
capitalization rules have to be taken into account. In response to changing corporate needs the 
present paper focuses on the tax consequences of hybrid financial instruments. Only some 
literature exists on cross-border hybrid finance. Especially the linkage between the two areas 
– hybrid finance and thin capitalization – both on a national and international level had to be 
dealt with academically. The paper analyses the substantive scope of thin capitalization 
regimes in general and in detail. The main finding is that the tax consequences of hybrid 
instruments reverse when used in thin capitalization situations and that traditional tax policy 
has to be reconsidered. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Roughly spoken a company may be financed by equity or by loans. As a rule, the choice of 
the means of financing is up to the shareholders. Apart from economic and legal 
circumstances, tax motives may lead to the decision of a company’s shareholder to use loan 
capital rather than equity (Lüthi, 1991: 446; Knobbe-Keuk, 1992: 405). Indeed, the tax 
treatment of a company and its shareholders differs significantly according to whether the 
raised capital is equity or loan capital: whereas the return on an equity investment (dividend 
distribution) forms part of the company’s taxable profit, the return on a loan investment 
(interest payment) is generally regarded as deductible expense in computing the taxable profit 
(OECD, 1987: 9; McDaniel and McMahon and Simmons, 1999: 497). Financing structures 
with a small proportion of equity are therefore generally more advantageous as they reduce a 
company’s tax burden not only in a national but possibly also in an international contexti. 
However, from a legal or economic point of view, e.g. in connection with ‘Basel II’, equity-
strong financing may be required. In this regard, the use of hybrid financial instruments is the 
source of interesting tax planning techniques (Herzig, 2000: 483; Eberhartinger and Six, 
2006: 5). Hybrid financial instruments can be designed in a way that they provide capital that 
is economically similar to equity but taxed as debt (McDaniel and McMahon and Simmons, 
1999: 497). Through the use of hybrid instruments inconsistencies in national tax systems can 
be exploited and double non-taxation may arise. 
 
In recent years, the free choice of financing by shareholders is increasingly restricted 
(Lüthi, 1991: 446). More and more countries tend to introduce so-called thin capitalization 
rules to restrict excessive (shareholder-) debt financing of companies (Endres, 2006: 257 et 
seq.). Tax authorities want to detect disproportionate use of loan investments and prevent a 
potential loss of tax income with regard to cross-border financing structures (e.g., Van Raad, 
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1986: 178; Lüthi, 1991: 447; Gouthière, 2005: 367). Thin capitalization rules are of special 
interest when companies use hybrid financial instruments to finance their activities in a tax-
minimizing way. Hybrid financial instruments may come under the substantive scope of 
national thin capitalization rules and may be included in the computation of a safe haven. For 
this very reason a qualification of hybrid instruments either as equity or as debt is essential. 
Thin capitalization rules, however, may stipulate special classification criteria. In addition to a 
possible inclusion of hybrid instruments in the calculation of the safe haven the tax 
consequences of the thin capitalization rule may also be applied to debt-alike hybrid 
instruments. Therefore, in thin capitalization situations the favourable tax treatment of debt-
alike hybrid financial instruments may be lost and other group financing structures may be 
influenced negatively. Equity-alike hybrid instruments may become more advantageous. 
 
The focus of this paper rests on the taxation of cross-border finance of multinational 
companies. The taxation of partnerships will not be part of the analysis. The use of abnormal 
or excessive rates of interest will not be dealt with in this paper either. It is the aim of this 
paper to address the above-mentioned issues and call attention to the fact that well-known tax 
planning techniques (Merks, 2006) possibly have to be reconsidered in corporate tax 
planning. The theoretical analysis will be completed by the country-specific regulations of six 
countries. The countries chosen are Austria on the one hand, being the home country of this 
research project, and its most important capital import and capital export countries.ii An 
illustrative example will help to demonstrate the tax effects of corporate cross-border finance. 
II. TAX ASPECTS OF CORPORATE FINANCE 
It is important to point out that tax motives may not be the main or only reason leading 
to the financing decision of multinational enterprises (OECD, 1987: 9 et seq.; Endres, 2006: 
256). Legal and economic conditions also must be taken into account (Hosson and Michielse, 
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1989: 476; OECD, 1996: 90). However, tax is cost and cost means profit reduction. Tax 
minimization therefore directly corresponds to the managerial aim of profit maximization. 
Shareholders have to structure their financing activities in order to minimize the tax burden 
(Endres, 2006: 258). 
 
Basically there are two methods of finance: equity and debt. Shareholders of a company 
are generally free in the choice of finance (OECD, 1987: 9; Bittker and Eustice, 2000: 4-4; 
Gouthière, 2005: 367).iii Because of various reasons shareholders tend to use debt financing 
rather than equity financing (Piltz, 1996: 92). In fact, equity is risk capital. An equity 
investment leads not only to a change in holdings and voting rights but also to an increase in 
responsible capital. While an equity investment offers entrepreneurial independence and 
additional creditworthiness, the formal requirements of an equity investment are enormous. 
The advantages of a debt investment are e.g. a lower risk assumption, a return on investment 
independent of the result of the company, possible exploitation of the leverage effect etc. 
(Piltz, 1996: 92; Endres, 2006: 256). For a clear distinction between equity and debt 
contributions see table 1. 
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Classification criterion Equity Debt
Legal position
Entrepreneurial influence
Substantial holding
Profit participation
Tax classification
Type of compensation
Compensation
Liability
Collateral
Order in case of insolvency
Term of capital commitment
Right to compensation
(co-)ownership rights creditor rights
normally full information, control 
and voting rights
normally no information, control 
and voting rights
sharing in profits and losses; 
participation in hidden reserves 
and liquidation proceeds
normally fixed return 
independent of profits and losses
at least amounting to the share no liability
no collateral (preferential) collateral
subordinated preferential
no fixed repayment provision fixed repayment provision
residual right nominal right
dividend payment interest payment
non deductible profit distribution deductible interest expense
 
Table 1 Classification Criteria of Equity and Debtiv 
 
Due to changing corporate needs the simple differentiation between debt and equity 
does not mirror the diversity of finance any more (e.g., Leitinger, 2005; Hudetz, 2005; 
Müller-Känel, 2004). Many financial instruments show elements of both categories or can be 
converted from one type to the other (Duncan, 2000: 23; Kahn/Lehman: 2001, 502 et seq.; 
Bittker and Eustice: 2000, 4-21). These financial instruments are called ‘hybrid financial 
instruments’ or ‘mezzanine finance’.v Hybrid financial instrument are financial instruments 
that have economic characteristics that are inconsistent, in whole or in part, with the 
classification implied by their legal form (Duncan, 2000; see table 2). 
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Classification criterion Hybrid Financial Instruments
Legal position
Entrepreneurial influence
Substantial holding
Profit participation
Tax classification
Type of compensation
Compensation
Liability
Collateral
Order in case of insolvency
Term of capital commitment
Right to compensation
inconsistent; possibly conversion right
normally few information, control and voting rights
(interest) return dependent on profit and losses
up to the amount that is converted into equity
no collateral; subordination clause
preferential compared to shareholders; subordinated compared to creditors
normally long-term
via equity-kicker
inconsistent
normally deductible expense
 
Table 2 Classification Criteria of Hybrid Financial Instruments1 
 
Hybrid financial instruments can be tailored to meet the needs of every investor. The 
spectrum of hybrid financial instruments ranges from corporate shares with features typically 
associated with loans and loan contracts with conditions typical of equity investments. The 
more debt characteristics are included in an instrument, the more likely a classification as debt 
for tax purposes is and vice versa (Helminen, 2004: 57). However, countries weigh 
characteristics differently and are so unanimous about classification. In general, debt-equity 
hybrids include e.g. preference shares, silent partnerships, jouissance rights, participation 
bonds, convertible bonds, warrant bonds and profit participation loans (table 3). 
                                                 
1 See also Bittker and Eustice: 2000, 4-23 et seq. 
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Method of finance Financial Instrument
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? Convertible bond
? Warrant bond
? Silent partnership
? Jouissance right
? Loan linked with equity-kicker
? Shareholder loan
? ’normal’ loan
 
Table 3 Spectrum of Hybrid Financial Instruments 
 
A basic problem in connection with business finance is the fact that the terms ‘equity’ 
and ‘debt’ are not defined uniformly in national as well as international corporate, accounting 
and tax law and they do not imply the same legal consequences. As a matter of fact the 
classification of hybrid instruments is even more complicated. Hybrid instruments cannot be 
clearly attributed to either equity or debt. Only few of these instruments are regulated by law. 
For tax purposes, however, a clear attribution of financial instruments to either equity or debt 
is crucial. Due to the lack of tax neutrality in finance (Kofler and Payerer, 2004: 54; Seibold, 
2002: 164) not only the inflow but also the return on investment is treated differently for tax 
purposes (Kahn and Lehman: 2001, 41 et seq.). The return on equity investments is in 
principle subject to double taxation (Posin and Tobin: 2005, 86; Rose and Chommie: 1994, 
522): once at the level of the profit generating company and once at the level of the 
shareholder in case of distribution. Dividends are part of a company’s taxable profit, which 
means that they do not reduce the company’s taxable base. At the level of the shareholder 
dividends are subject to capital gains tax. The return on loan investments on the contrary is 
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generally taxed only once at the level of the shareholder. At the level of the lending company 
interest is a tax-deductible expense leading to a reduction in the corporate taxable base. 
Additionally, refinancing costs are tax deductible at the level of the shareholder. In 
conclusion, debt financing is generally more favourable than the contribution of equity capital 
(Kahn and Lehman: 2001, 45). 
 
Tax classification criteria of hybrid instruments are not necessarily congruent with 
economical or legal criteria and depend on a country’s legislation, jurisdiction and 
administrative practice (OECD, 1987: 14). Different criteria, e.g. the performance-
dependency of payments, the bearing of risk etc., must be interpreted and carefully weighted 
in order to do a final classification. The differences in classification are an important source of 
corporate tax planning opportunities and risks (Helminen, 2004: 56). In cross-border 
situations, hybrid instruments may be treated as debt in the source state and as equity in the 
country of residence of the shareholder and vice versa. The return on the investment would be 
deductible in the source state and exempt from tax in the state of residence of the shareholder. 
In the opposite case, the return on the hybrid instrument would be treated as a non deductible 
profit distribution in the source state and as a taxable interest payment in the country of 
residence of the shareholder (Herzig, 2000: 485). Disregarding anti-avoidance rules, e.g. 
‘subject-to-tax-clauses’ (Schilcher, 2004: 34 et seq.), double non-taxation or double taxation 
may be the result. 
III. THIN CAPITALIZATION RULES 
A. THE CONCEPT OF THIN CAPITALIZATION RULES 
The term ‘thin capitalization’ simply refers to a company’s capital structure which is 
characterised by a high proportion of (shareholder-) debt to equity. Expressions like ‘hidden 
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equity capitalisation’ or ‘shareholder debt financing’ are often used synonymously (OECD, 
1987: 11). 
 
It is a fact that the conditions for, definitions of and exceptions from thin capitalization 
rules vary from country to country. The aim of every set of regulations on thin capitalization, 
however, is the same: the avoidance of excessive debt financing, especially through 
shareholders, and of the corresponding loss of tax revenue in the source country (e.g., 
Knobbe-Keuk, 1992: 408; Grotherr, 1995: 52; Thömmes, 2004: 126; Endres, 2006: 258). In 
cross border situations the main portion of the tax revenue from interest payments is realised 
in the country of residence of the lender. The main portion of the tax revenue from dividend 
payments on the contrary is realised in the source country. Therefore tax administrations 
began to introduce thin capitalization rules. The preliminary question of thin capitalization 
rules is, whether or not the payment concerned derives from a loan or equity contribution 
(OECD, 1987: 13). In the beginning thin capitalization rules consequently have been applied 
to cross-border situations only. Due to developments in European Lawvi, however, several 
countries broadened the scope of their thin capitalization rules and included domestic 
situations also (e.g., Obser, 2005: 7). 
B. LEGAL BASIS OF THIN CAPITALIZATION RULES 
Measures taken against thin capitalization of companies are either based on general tax 
rules or regulated by specific law. Those countries which penalize thin capitalization with 
general tax rules rely on principles such as the substance over form principle, the general 
arm’s length principle or the abuse of law concept (Piltz, 1996: 102 et seq.). Normally these 
principles are derived from a country’s jurisdiction or administrative practice and used only in 
extreme cases (e.g. Austria). 
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Austria - Art 8 (2) CTA -
Germany Art 8a CTA Art 8 (3) 2nd sentence CTA 1994
Czech Republic Art 25 (1)(w) ITA - 2005a
Hungary Art 8 (1)(j) und (5) CDTA - 1992
Netherlands Art 10 d Wet Vpb - 2004
United Kingdom Schedule 28 AA ICTA 1988    [s. 209 ICTA 1988] - 2004
a
C
ou
nt
ry Type of Thin Capitalization Rule
Introduction
Specific law General Rule                   Administration Practice
 
a new rule 
 
Table 4 Legal Basis of Thin Capitalization Rules of Different Countries 
 
Countries with particular rules on thin capitalization specify a certain unobjectionable 
debt to equity ratio (fixed-ratio-approach, see e.g. McDaniel and McMahon and Simmons, 
1999: 514 et seq.) or reclassify interests paid to non-residents in general. Sometimes countries 
grant exceptions to the basic rule for certain types of activities and groups of companies. In 
some countries thin capitalization rules are applied only to particular industries, shareholders, 
managing directors or holding companies (Piltz, 1996: 101 et seq.). Mostly countries pursue a 
fixed-ratio-approach and additionally refer to the arm’s length principle when applying their 
thin capitalization rule (table 5) (see e.g. Kessler and Obser, 2004).  
Austria - x x -
Germany 1,5:1 - xa 250.000 € / -
Czech Republic 4:1 / 6:1 - - -
Hungary 3:1 - - -
Netherlands 3:1/               group ratio test - - - / 500.000 €
b
United Kingdom - - x -
Threshold/Tax 
Exemption
C
ou
nt
ry Fixed Debt/Equity 
Ratio
General Anti Abuse 
Approach Arm's Length Test
 
a no arm's length test for profit-dependent return 
b not in connection with group ratio test 
 
Table 5 Country-specific Thin Capitalization Approaches 
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C. TAX CONSEQUENCES OF THIN CAPITALIZATION RULES 
The tax consequences at the level of the subsidiary in the source country can be divided 
into three categories (Piltz, 1996: 119 et seq.): 
1. reclassification of debt as equity, 
2. non-deductibility of interest, 
3. reclassification of interest as (hidden) profit distribution. 
As a result, all thin capitalization rules lead to the non-deductibility of the payment on ‘bad’ 
debt at the level of the subsidiary. Thus an increase in the taxable base of the subsidiary has to 
be expected. 
 
The country of residence of the parent company generally has two options in treating the 
return on investment: tax it as interest or tax it as profit distribution. If the country of 
residence does not agree with the tax treatment in the source country and taxes the return on 
the debt investment as regular interest, double taxation will be the result. If the country of 
residence, on the other hand, accepts the characterisation of the source country and makes a 
corresponding adjustment of the tax burden at the level of the parent company – normally by 
granting an exemption from tax -, single taxation can be achieved. The country of residence, 
yet, will lose part of its tax revenue. 
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A
U
T
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E
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C
Z
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U N
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U
K
Austria x no yes yes yes -
Germany x no no no yes yes
Czech Republic x no yes no no yes
Hungary x no no no yes no
Nehterlands x no no no yes yes
United Kingdom x no no no yes yes
C
ou
nt
ry
Tax Consequence Corresponding Adjustment in                           
Country of Residence(permanent) 
Reclassification in 
Dividends
(permanent)  Non-
Deductibility
 
Table 6 Tax Consequences of Thin Capitalization Rules (see Zielke, 2006) 
D. SUBSTANTIVE SCOPE OF THIN CAPITALIZATION RULES 
1. Preliminary remarks 
Countries with special thin capitalization regulations generally follow the concept of a 
fixed debt to equity ratio. Within certain limits the return on the debt financing remains 
deductible; the taxpayer rests in a ‘safe haven’. The unobjectionable debt-equity ratio varies 
from country to country. For the application of thin capitalization rules either the level of debt 
of the lending company in total or against individual shareholders or certain groups of 
shareholders is relevant. Some countries also grant a certain threshold. If the debt financing 
does not attain a minimum amount, the thin capitalization rule is not applicable. Groups of 
companies or certain industries may be subject to different treatment in this context. As the 
taxpayer normally has to bear the burden of proof, the definition of the respective variables 
has to be examined in detail. Firstly, the question has to be answered, what the relevant equity 
capital is. Secondly, the relevant loan capital has to be defined. Finally, it must be determined 
if hybrid instruments are also included in the substantive scope of thin capitalization rules. 
 
As a rule, the more equity components and the less debt components a company’s 
capital structure has, the more favourable the debt-equity ratio and consequently the effects of 
a thin capitalization will be. With reference to the discussion in chapter II this seams quite 
contradictory. The conclusion of the previous discussion was that from a tax perspective debt 
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financing is generally more advantageous than equity financing. In thin capitalization 
situations, however, it is exactly the opposite way round. If a company uses debt financing 
structures beyond the safe haven, the result in the source country will definitely be the denial 
of the interest deduction. This is exactly what tax administrations want: tax the return on 
investments originally classified as debt as profit distributions in order to assure single 
taxation in the source country. The problem arises when crossing the borderline. If the 
resident country is willing to treat the payment as dividends also, the overall tax burden will 
be identical with the tax burden of straight equity finance. If the country of residence, on the 
contrary, is not willing to follow the classification of the source country the same economic 
substance will be taxed twice. For this reason, the use of pure equity financing is more 
favourable, especially more certain in its consequences. The very same is true for the use of 
hybrid financial instruments in thin capitalization situations. 
2. Equity Definition 
The meaning of equity in thin capitalization rules is largely consistent with the meaning 
of equity in commercial balance sheets. The authorized share capital, the surplus capital 
retained, retained earnings from previous years and untaxed reserves are typical equity 
components (Piltz, 1996: 110) and therefore generally considered in the calculation of the 
debt-equity ratio. The amount of equity is e.g. calculated at the previous year-end, the actual 
year-end or in a given year.  
3. Debt Definition 
Every set of regulations on thin capitalization clearly stipulates what is to be considered 
as debt. Depending on the country’s regime the following types of loan capital will or will not 
be included in the determination of the level of debt (see Piltz, 1996: 106 et seq.): 
1. Ordinary loans: ordinary loans with arm’s length interest rates and fixed 
repayment obligations are generally classified as debt. 
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2. Non-interest-bearing loans: as long as no interest payment is made, a country’s tax 
revenue cannot be lost and therefore an inclusion of non-interest-bearing loans in 
the computation of the level of debt does not make a sense. 
3. Short-term-loans: the treatment of short-term-loans is quite inconsistent. 
4. Back-to-back loansvii: as a rule, this form of loan financing comes under the scope 
of all thin capitalization rules. 
5. Third party loans: if a third party has the right to take recourse on the shareholder 
based on a surety, guarantee, statement of support etc. the loan will generally 
increase the level of debt. Some countries, however, differentiate. 
The relevant amount of debt is either the amount of debt at year-end, an average annual 
amount of debt, the highest amount of debt in a given year, a choice between the highest and 
the average amount of debt or some other figure. 
4. Hybrid Financial Instruments 
Thin capitalization rules typically control shareholder loans and high-debt equity ratios 
respectively. Nevertheless hybrid instrumentsviii may also fall under the substantive scope of 
thin capitalization rules. De Hosson and Michielse (1989: 477) see a possible manifestation of 
thin capitalisation in hybrid financial instruments when shareholders provide capital that ‘is 
essentially equity capital in prima facie clothing as a loan’ (see also Lüthi, 1991: 446). Even 
if hybrid instruments do not come under the substantive scope of thin capitalization rules they 
may be included in the computation of the safe haven. Due to the personal scope of certain 
thin capitalization rules, not only hybrid finance through shareholders but also through third 
parties must be taken into account. Table 7 gives an overview of the substantial scope of thin 
capitalization rules of selected countries (Gassner, 1996; Watrin and Lühn, 2004; Smit and 
Smith, 2005; Végh and Szűcs, 2005; Nias and Purcell, 2005; Trezziová and Fekar, 2005). 
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Austria - - - - - -
Germany x - x x x x
Czech Republic x - - - - -
Hungary x - - - - -
Netherlandsb x/x -/x -/x -/x -/x -/xc
United Kingdom x - - x x -d
C
ou
nt
ry
Substantive Scope of Thin Capitalization Rules
'Normal' Loan Short-Term Loan
Interest-Free 
Loan
Back to Back 
Loan
Third Party 
Loan with 
Recoursea
Hybrid 
Financial 
Instrument
 
a e.g. certificate of bond, letter of comfort 
b two different methods of calculation dependent on the test chosen: 
 a) safe haven test: net debt-calculation according to tax balance sheet items; only 'money loans' are included 
 b) group ratio test: no net debt-calculation; all liabilities of the commercial balance sheet have to be included 
c Art 10 (1)(d) ITA - specific rule for 'hybrid loans': neither equity nor debt; interest non-deductible when equity-
hybrid 
d International Arbitrage Rules  
 
Table 7 Substantive Scope of Thin Capitalization Rules in different Countries 
 
In any case, the classification of hybrid instruments for thin capitalization purposes as 
either debt or equity is decisive. In most cases the classification criteria are consistent with the 
general classification criteria in tax law, provided that they exist. Sometimes, however, 
traditional tax classification rules are insufficient. Debt-alike hybrid instruments do typically 
have a negative impact on the taxation of companies in thin capitalization situations. If a debt-
alike hybrid instrument e.g. is not included in the substantive scope but nevertheless in the 
calculation of the safe haven, the taxation of ‘regular’ (shareholder) loan capital may be 
influenced negatively. If a debt-alike hybrid instrument is included in the safe haven 
calculation and in the substantive scope, such hybrid instruments do not only have negative 
influence on the level of debt but also lose their own tax attractiveness. Equity-alike hybrid 
instruments, on the contrary, always have a positive effect on the taxation of thinly capitalized 
companies. The following table (table 4) shows possible constellations of hybrid instruments 
in thin capitalization situations. 
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Table 8 Possible Consequences of Hybrid Financial Instruments in Thin Capitalization Situations 
IV. COMPARISON OF TAX BURDEN – AN ILLUSTRATIVE 
EXAMPLE 
The following two tables (table 9 and 10) shall illustrate the tax consequences of cross-
border group-finance discussed in chapter III. The source country or the country of residence 
of the subsidiary is Germany. The country of residence of the parent company is Austria. 
Whereas Germany pursues a strict thin capitalization regime (e.g., Obser, 2005), according to 
Austrian Corporate Tax Act a company is supposed to be thinly capitalized only in extreme 
cases (Gassner, 1996). The following assumptions have been made: 
1. Only corporations are included; 
2. The parent company has a holding of 100 % of the subsidiary; 
3. The rate of interest is at arm’s length; 
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4. In case of loan financing the EBIT is used up by interest payments; 
5. Only income taxes are considered and 
6. Refinancing costs at the level of the parent company are not taken into account. 
Source Country: Germany
Country of Residence: Austria
Method of Finance Equity GER: Interest
a 
AUT: Interest
GER: Art 8ac    
AUT: Dividends
GER: Art 8ac   
AUT: Interest
Level of Subsidiary in GER
EBIT 500,00 500,00 500,00 500,00
Interest on Loan -500,00 -500,00 -500,00
+ Reclassified Interest 500,00 500,00
EBT 500,00 0,00 500,00 500,00
German Trade Tax (16,67 %)b -83,33 -41,67 -83,34 -83,34
Corporate Income Tax (25 %) -104,17 10,42 -104,17 -104,17
Solidarity Surcharge (5,5 %) -5,73 0,57 -5,73 -5,73
Distributable Profit 306,77 -30,68 306,77 306,77
Level of Parent Company in GER
Capital Income (Art 49 (1) 5a German ITA) 306,77 0,00 306,77 306,77
No Withholding Tax on Dividends                       
(Art 43b German ITA) 0,00 0,00 0,00
No Withholding Tax on Interest                          
(Art 43 (1)  7 German ITA) 0,00
Level of Parent Company in AUT
Participation Exemption 306,77 306,77
Interest Income 500,00 500,00
Corporate Income Tax (25 %) -125,00 -125,00
Net Profit 306,77 344,32 306,77 181,77
Total Tax Burden 193,23 155,68 193,23 318,23
38.65% 31.14% 38.65% 63.65%
Shareholder Loan
 
a Interest payment > 250.000 €, > safe haven but positive arm’s length test 
b Half of the interest on long-term debt has to be added for trade tax purposes 
c Interest payment > 250.000 €; > safe haven, negative arm’s length test 
 
Table 9 Tax Consequences of Cross-Border Shareholder Loans in Comparison 
 
Table 9 clearly shows that a shareholder loan (31.14 %) is more favourable than an 
equity investment as long as the safe haven of 251.000 € is not exceeded or the arm’s length 
test was positive. If the unobjectionable debt to equity ratio is exceeded, however, the 
minimum tax burden amounts to 38.65 % and equals the tax burden of a regular equity 
contribution. A tax burden of 63.65 % has to be expected if the country of residence, namely 
Austria, is not willing to make a corresponding adjustment. Economic double taxation is the 
Hybrid Finance in Thin Capitalization Situations 
17 
result. In order to avoid the worst case tax burden, the parent company may substitute half of 
the shareholder loan by a hybrid financial instrument. Depending on the classification of the 
hybrid instrument as either equity or debt the safe haven of Art 8a German CTA will be 
exceeded or not. 
Source Country: Germany
Country of Residence: Austria
GER: HI = Equity GER: HI = Debt GER: HI = Debt
Method of Finance → no Art 8a → Art 8a → Art 8a
AUT: Interest/Dividenda AUT: Interest/Interestc AUT: Dividend/Dividendd
Level of Subsidiary in GER
EBIT 500,00 500,00 500,00
Interest on Loan -250,00 -250,00 -250,00
Interest on Hybrid Instrument -250,00 -250,00
+ Reclassified Interest (on Shareholder Loan) 250,00 250,00
+ Reclassified Interest (on Hybrid Instrument) 250,00 250,00
EBT 250,00 500,00 500,00
German Trade Tax (16,67 %)b -62,50 -83,34 -83,34
Corporate Income Tax (25 %) -46,87 -104,17 -104,17
Solidarity Surcharge (5,5 %) -2,58 -5,73 -5,73
Distributable Profit 138,05 306,77 306,77
Level of Parent Company in GER
Capital Income (Art 49 (1) 5a German ITA) 138,05 306,77 306,77
No Withholding Tax on Dividends                            
(Art 43b German ITA) 0,00 0,00 0,00
No Withholding Tax on Interest                               
(Art 43 (1)  7 German ITA) 0,00
Level of Parent Company in AUT
Participation Exemption 138,05 306,77
Interest Income (Loan and Hybrid Instrument) 250,00 500,00
Corporate Income Tax (25 %) -62,50 -125,00
Net profit 325,55 181,77 306,77
Total tax burden 174,45 318,23 193,23
34.89% 63.65% 38.65%
Shareholder Loan + Hybrid Instrument
 
HI Hybrid Instrument 
a Austria classifies the return on the shareholder loan as interest and the return on the hybrid instrument as 
dividend 
b Half of the interest on long-term debt has to be added for trade tax purposes 
c Austria classifies the return on the shareholder loan as interest and the return on the hybrid instrument as 
interest (no corresponding adjustment) 
d Austria classifies the return on the shareholder loan as dividend and the return on the hybrid instrument as 
dividend (corresponding adjustment) 
 
Table 10 Tax Consequences of Hybrid Instruments in Thin Capitalization Situations 
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Through the use of an equity-alike hybrid instrument in connection with a (lower) 
shareholder loan the tax burden can be reduced to 34.89 %. Compared to the tax burden of a 
pure loan financing (table 9) this structure is a bit less favourable; the risk of a reclassification 
according to the thin capitalization rule, however, is eliminated. Compared to the tax burden 
of pure equity finance (table 9) the substitution by an equity-alike hybrid instrument is more 
favourable not only with regard to the tax burden but also with regard to the legal 
requirements. The use of debt-alike hybrid instruments, on the other hand, leads to a tax 
burden of 38.65 % provided Austria makes a corresponding adjustment. If the country of 
residence of the parent company refuses to make a corresponding adjustment, as in most 
cases, again double taxation is the result. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Hybrid financial instruments clearly offer tax planning opportunities, in particular in a 
cross-border setting. Hybrid instruments may be tailored in a way that they provide capital 
that is economically similar to equity but taxed as debt. With regard to the variation in the 
extent to which such instruments are used and the inconsistency in tax classification between 
countries the overall corporate tax burden can be minimized. However, the use of hybrid 
financial instruments can be risky. In connection with thin capitalization the favourable tax 
consequences of debt-alike hybrid financial instruments may reverse: 
- The deductibility of payments on excessive ‘debt’ at the level of the subsidiary is lost, 
- Double taxation may arise when the residence country is not willing to make a 
corresponding adjustment; 
- Other group financing structures may be influenced negatively. 
Therefore the use of equity-alike hybrid instruments becomes more advantageous. The main 
question, which classic method of finance – debt or equity - hybrid instruments are assigned 
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to in thin capitalization rules has to be answered for each country separately. These findings 
are, however, not valid for countries: 
- which do not sanction thin capitalization at all 
- which do sanction thin capitalization only in very extreme cases and 
- whose thin capitalization rules do not include hybrid financial instruments at all. 
In planning business with companies situated in these countries the traditional tax policy will 
be effective. The present paper is of particular importance to the field of tax management as it 
calls attention to find alternatives in cross-border company finance. Leasing contracts, 
factoring, real capital investments or (non-revolving) short-term loan financing are only a few 
examples (e.g. Obser, 2005: 159 et seq.). 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Bittker, B.I. and Eustice, J.S. (2000) Federal Income Taxation of Corporations and 
Shareholders 7th Edition, Warren, Gorham & Lamont: Valhalla. 
De Hosson, F. C. and Michielse, G. M. M. (1989) ‘Treaty aspects of the ‘thin capitalisation’ 
issue – A review of the OECD Report’, Intertax, 476-484. 
Eberhartinger, E. and Six, M. (2006) ‘National Tax Policy, the Directives and Hybrid 
Finance. Options for tax policy in the context of the treatment of Hybrid Financial 
Instruments in the Parent-Subsidiary Directive and the Interest and Royalties 
Directive’, Discussion Paper No. 16, Wien, pp. 1-27. 
Endres, D. (2006) ‘Zur steueroptimalen Vergabe von Eigen- und Fremdkapital im Ausland’, 
Praxis Internationale Steuerberatung, 255-258. 
Duncan, J.A. (2000) ‘General Report’, in IFA (ed.) Cahiers de droit fiscal international 
Volume LXXXVa, Tax treatment of hybrid financial instruments, Kluwer Law 
International: The Hague, pp. 21-34. 
Gassner, W. (1996) ‘Austria’, in IFA (ed.) Cahiers de droit fiscal international Volume 
LXXXIb, International aspects of thin capitalization, Kluwer Law International: The 
Hague, pp. 315-339. 
Hybrid Finance in Thin Capitalization Situations 
20 
Gouthière, B. (2005), ‘A Comparative Study of the Thin Capitalization Rules in the Member 
States of the European Union and Certain Other States’, European Taxation, 367-369. 
Grotherr, S. (1995) ‘Ausländische Unterkapitalisierungsregelungen’, in D.J. Piltz and H. 
Schaumburg (eds.) Unternehmensfinanzierung im Internationalen Steuerrecht, Dr. Otto 
Schmidt: Köln, pp. 49-87. 
Helminen, M. (2004), ‘Classification of Cross-Border Payments on Hybrid Instruments’, 
Bulletin, 56-61. 
Herzig, N. (2000) ‘Thema I: Hybride Finanzierungsinstrumente im nationalen und 
internationalen Steuerrecht’, IStR, 482-485. 
Hudetz, T. (2005) ‘Voraussichtliche Auswirkungen von Basel II auf Bonitätsbeurteilung 
durch österreichische Kreditinstitute bei hybriden Finanzierungen – als eigene 
Bankforderung oder als externer Kapitalisierungsteil’, in M. Bischof and E. 
Eberhartinger (eds.) Hybride Finanzierungsinstrumente, Linde Verlag: Wien, pp. 141-
182. 
Kahn, A. and Lehman, J.S. (2001) Corporate Income Taxation 5th Edition, West Publishing 
Co: St.Paul. 
Kessler, W. and Obser, R. (2004) ‘Überblick zur Gesellschafter-Fremdfinanzierung in den 
Mitgliedstaaten der Europäischen Union’, IStR, 187-191. 
Kofler, H. and Payerer, A. (2004) ‘Steuern und Außenfinanzierung’, in R. Bertl et al (eds.) 
Handbuch der österreichischen Steuerlehre Bd IV, Lexis Nexis Verlag: Wien, pp. 53-
86. 
Knobbe-Keuk, B. (1992) ‘Developments in Thin Capitalization and Some Legal Obstacles to 
Legislation’, European Taxation, 405-408.  
Leitinger, R. (2005) ‘Mezzaninkapital als alternatives Finanzierungsinstrument’, in M. 
Bischof and E. Eberhartinger (eds.) Hybride Finanzierungsinstrumente, Linde Verlag: 
Wien, pp. 33-54. 
Lüthi, D. (1991) ‘Thin capitalisation of companies in international tax law’, Intertax, 446-453. 
McDaniel, P.R. and McMahon, M.J.jr and Simmons, D.L. (1999) Federal Income Taxation of 
Business Organizations, Foundation Press: New York. 
Merks, P. (2006) ‘Categorizing Corporate Cross-Border Tax Planning Techniques’, Tax Notes 
International, 55-69. 
Müller-Känel, O. (2004) Mezzanine Finance – Neue Perspektiven in der 
Unternehmensfinanzierung, Haupt: Bern/Wien. 
Nias, P. M. W. and Purcell, N. (2005) ‘United Kingdom’, European Taxation, 435-441. 
Hybrid Finance in Thin Capitalization Situations 
21 
Obser, R. (2005) ‘Gesellschafter-Fremdfinanzierung im europäischen Konzern’, in IDW (ed.) 
Wissenschaftliche Schriften zur Wirtschaftsprüfung’, IDW Verlag GmbH: Düsseldorf. 
OECD (1987) ‘Thin Capitalisation’, in OECD (ed.) Issues in International Taxation No 2, 
OECD Publications: Paris, pp. 7-36. 
Piltz, D. J. (1996) ‘General Report’, in IFA (ed.) Cahiers de droit fiscal international Volume 
LXXXIb, International aspects of thin capitalization, Kluwer Law International: The 
Hague, pp. 83-140. 
Posh, D. Q. and Tobin, D. T. (2005) Principles of Federal Income Taxation 7th Edition, 
Thomson/West: St.Paul. 
Rose, M.D. and Chommie, J.C. (1994) Federal Income Taxation 3rd Edition, West Publishing 
Co.: St.Paul. 
Schilcher, M. (2004) ‘Subject-to-tax-Klauseln in der österreichischen Abkommenspraxis’, in 
M. Lang (ed.) Schriftenreihe zum Internationalen Steuerrecht Bd 33, Linde Verlag: 
Wien. 
Seibold, S. (2002) Steuerliche Betriebswirtschaftslehre in nationaler und transnationaler 
Sicht, Erich Schmidt: Bielefeld. 
Smit, P. and Smith, E. (2005) ‘Netherlands’, European Taxation, 417-423. 
Thömmes, O. and Stricof, R. and Nakhai K. (2004) ‘Thin Capitalization Rules and Non-
Discrimination Principles’, Intertax, 126-137. 
Trezziová, D. and Fekar, P. (2005) ‘Czech Republic’, European Taxation, 378-381. 
Van Raad, K. (1986) Nondiscrimination in International Tax Law, Kluwer Law and Taxation 
Publishers: Deventer/Antwerpen/London/Frankfurt/Boston/New York. 
Végh, P. G. and Szűcs, B. (2005) ‘Hungary’, European Taxation, 398-402. 
Watrin, Ch. and Lühn, M. (2004) ‘Mezzanine-Finanzierungen im Rahmen des § 8a KStG n. 
F.’, StuB, 724-731. 
Zielke, R. (2006) ‘Gesellschafter-Fremdfinanzierung und Doppelbesteuerung in der 
Europäischen Union’, RIW, 600-610. 
                                                 
i It should be noted that in an international context the level of corporate tax is decisive also. As to minimize the 
group tax rate, parent companies situated in a high tax country will decide to finance their foreign subsidiary 
with equity rather than debt.  
ii The most important capital import and capital export countries were chosen according to the income of direct 
foreign investments and the income of foreign direct investments in Austria. See Österreichische Nationalbank, 
Österreichische Direktinvestitionen im Ausland und ausländische Direktinvestitionen in Österreich, Stand per 
Ende 2005, Sonderheft Statistiken, 26 f, 
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iii In this context literature often mentions the unwritten ‘principle of the freedom of finance’ or the ‘principle of 
the free management of enterprises’ that can be derived from jurisdiction (e.g., Obser, 2005: 1). 
iv See also Kahn and Lehman, 2001: 56 et seq. and McDaniel and McMahon and Simmons, 1999: 499 et seq., 
507. 
v The word ‘mezzanine’ can be derived from the Italian word ‘mezzanino’ used in architecture. The term 
‘mezzanine finance’ is typically used in business context, especially in connection with Leveraged Buy-Outs. 
From a tax perspective the term ‘hybrid finance’ is more common. 
vi Especially the decision of the European Court of Justice in the case Lankhorst-Hohorst caused the broadening 
of the scope of several thin capitalization rules. In the case Lankhorst Hohorst the European Court of Justice 
decided that the German thin capitalization rule applied to non-residents only is incompatible with the right of 
establishment. See ECJ, 12 December 2002, C-324/00, Lankhorst-Hohorst [2002] ECR I-11802. 
vii For a clear definition of the term ‘back-to-back-loan’ see e.g., Piltz, 1996: 107. 
viii Shareholder loans are sometimes referred to as hybrid (financial) instruments because owners take the 
position of a creditor. 
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